feat(domain-access): verify manifest signatures

This commit is contained in:
冰朔 2026-08-10 02:07:25 +08:00
commit fa2c868e0a
2 changed files with 153 additions and 36 deletions

View file

@ -1,10 +1,30 @@
import test from 'node:test'; import test from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict'; import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { evaluateDomainAccess, parseDomainAccessHandoff } from './domain-access.js'; import { createHash, generateKeyPairSync, sign } from 'node:crypto';
import {
domainManifestSigningBytes,
evaluateDomainAccess,
parseDomainAccessHandoff,
} from './domain-access.js';
const NOW = 1_786_291_200_000; const NOW = 1_786_291_200_000;
const DIGEST = 'a'.repeat(64);
const COMMIT = 'b'.repeat(40); const COMMIT = 'b'.repeat(40);
const { privateKey, publicKey } = generateKeyPairSync('ed25519');
const trustedSigner = {
algorithm: 'Ed25519',
publicKeyPem: publicKey.export({ format: 'pem', type: 'spki' }).toString(),
repositoryId: 'REPO-014',
signerId: 'GH-LIGHTHOUSE-001',
} as const;
const manifestPayload = {
domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001',
repositoryId: 'REPO-014',
schema: 'gh-aios.domain-manifest/v1',
signerId: 'GH-LIGHTHOUSE-001',
sourceCommit: COMMIT,
} as const;
const signedBytes = domainManifestSigningBytes(manifestPayload);
const DIGEST = createHash('sha256').update(signedBytes).digest('hex');
const validHandoff = { const validHandoff = {
connectionReceipt: { connectionReceipt: {
@ -17,17 +37,8 @@ const validHandoff = {
}, },
manifest: { manifest: {
digest: DIGEST, digest: DIGEST,
domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', ...manifestPayload,
schema: 'gh-aios.domain-manifest/v1', signature: sign(null, signedBytes, privateKey).toString('base64'),
signerId: 'GH-LIGHTHOUSE-001',
sourceCommit: COMMIT,
verifierReceipt: {
manifestDigest: DIGEST,
signerId: 'GH-LIGHTHOUSE-001',
state: 'verified',
verifiedAt: NOW - 1_000,
verifierId: 'GH-MANIFEST-VERIFIER-001',
},
}, },
sessionCapability: { sessionCapability: {
capabilityId: 'CAP-001', capabilityId: 'CAP-001',
@ -37,6 +48,13 @@ const validHandoff = {
scopes: ['domain:enter'], scopes: ['domain:enter'],
}, },
} as const; } as const;
const verifiedHandoff = parseDomainAccessHandoff(
validHandoff,
'DOM-FIFTH-0001',
'LOCAL-001',
trustedSigner,
NOW,
);
test('a local workspace remains available without claiming domain runtime access', () => { test('a local workspace remains available without claiming domain runtime access', () => {
const status = evaluateDomainAccess({ accountVerified: false, domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', nodeId: '' }, NOW); const status = evaluateDomainAccess({ accountVerified: false, domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', nodeId: '' }, NOW);
@ -56,7 +74,7 @@ test('a verified Forgejo account is not a domain runtime session', () => {
}); });
test('runtime access requires matching manifest, scoped capability and online receipt', () => { test('runtime access requires matching manifest, scoped capability and online receipt', () => {
const handoff = parseDomainAccessHandoff(validHandoff, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', NOW); const handoff = parseDomainAccessHandoff(validHandoff, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', trustedSigner, NOW);
const status = evaluateDomainAccess({ const status = evaluateDomainAccess({
accountVerified: true, accountVerified: true,
domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001',
@ -73,7 +91,7 @@ test('mismatched or expired evidence fails closed', () => {
accountVerified: true, accountVerified: true,
connectionReceipt: { connectionId: 'CONN-001', domainId: 'DOMAIN-OTHER', manifestDigest: DIGEST, nodeId: 'LOCAL-001', receiptId: 'RECEIPT-001', state: 'online' }, connectionReceipt: { connectionId: 'CONN-001', domainId: 'DOMAIN-OTHER', manifestDigest: DIGEST, nodeId: 'LOCAL-001', receiptId: 'RECEIPT-001', state: 'online' },
domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001',
manifest: validHandoff.manifest, manifest: verifiedHandoff.manifest,
nodeId: 'LOCAL-001', nodeId: 'LOCAL-001',
sessionCapability: { capabilityId: 'CAP-001', domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', expiresAt: NOW, nodeId: 'LOCAL-001', scopes: ['domain:enter'] }, sessionCapability: { capabilityId: 'CAP-001', domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', expiresAt: NOW, nodeId: 'LOCAL-001', scopes: ['domain:enter'] },
}, NOW); }, NOW);
@ -82,18 +100,14 @@ test('mismatched or expired evidence fails closed', () => {
assert.ok(status.blockers.includes('matching_connection_receipt_missing')); assert.ok(status.blockers.includes('matching_connection_receipt_missing'));
}); });
test('a verified boolean cannot substitute for an external verifier receipt', () => { test('the input cannot supply its own verifier receipt', () => {
assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff({ assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff({
...validHandoff, ...validHandoff,
manifest: { manifest: {
digest: DIGEST, ...validHandoff.manifest,
domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', verifierReceipt: { state: 'verified' },
schema: 'gh-aios.domain-manifest/v1',
signerId: 'GH-LIGHTHOUSE-001',
sourceCommit: COMMIT,
verified: true,
}, },
}, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/); }, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', trustedSigner, NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/);
}); });
test('unknown fields and malformed digests fail closed', () => { test('unknown fields and malformed digests fail closed', () => {
@ -101,13 +115,55 @@ test('unknown fields and malformed digests fail closed', () => {
...validHandoff, ...validHandoff,
manifest: { ...validHandoff.manifest, digest: 'not-a-digest' }, manifest: { ...validHandoff.manifest, digest: 'not-a-digest' },
trusted: true, trusted: true,
}, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/); }, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', trustedSigner, NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/);
}); });
test('the handoff is bound to the requested domain, node and manifest digest', () => { test('the handoff is bound to the requested domain, node and manifest digest', () => {
assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff({ assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff({
...validHandoff, ...validHandoff,
connectionReceipt: { ...validHandoff.connectionReceipt, manifestDigest: 'c'.repeat(64) }, connectionReceipt: { ...validHandoff.connectionReceipt, manifestDigest: 'c'.repeat(64) },
}, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/); }, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', trustedSigner, NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/);
assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff(validHandoff, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'OTHER-NODE', NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/); assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff(validHandoff, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'OTHER-NODE', trustedSigner, NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/);
});
test('manifest tampering and signatures from another key fail closed', () => {
assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff({
...validHandoff,
manifest: { ...validHandoff.manifest, sourceCommit: 'c'.repeat(40) },
}, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', trustedSigner, NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/);
const other = generateKeyPairSync('ed25519');
assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff({
...validHandoff,
manifest: {
...validHandoff.manifest,
signature: sign(null, signedBytes, other.privateKey).toString('base64'),
},
}, 'DOM-FIFTH-0001', 'LOCAL-001', trustedSigner, NOW), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/);
});
test('trusted signer identity and repository are external inputs, not payload authority', () => {
assert.throws(() => parseDomainAccessHandoff(
validHandoff,
'DOM-FIFTH-0001',
'LOCAL-001',
{ ...trustedSigner, repositoryId: 'REPO-OTHER' },
NOW,
), /domain_access_handoff_invalid/);
});
test('copying verified-looking fields cannot bypass the in-process verifier boundary', () => {
const status = evaluateDomainAccess({
accountVerified: true,
connectionReceipt: verifiedHandoff.connectionReceipt,
domainId: 'DOM-FIFTH-0001',
manifest: {
...verifiedHandoff.manifest,
verifierReceipt: { ...verifiedHandoff.manifest.verifierReceipt },
},
nodeId: 'LOCAL-001',
sessionCapability: verifiedHandoff.sessionCapability,
}, NOW);
assert.equal(status.runtimeReady, false);
assert.ok(status.blockers.includes('verified_domain_manifest_missing'));
}); });

View file

@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
import { createHash, verify as verifySignature } from 'node:crypto';
const MANIFEST_SCHEMA = 'gh-aios.domain-manifest/v1' as const; const MANIFEST_SCHEMA = 'gh-aios.domain-manifest/v1' as const;
const SHA256_PATTERN = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/; const SHA256_PATTERN = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/;
const COMMIT_PATTERN = /^[a-f0-9]{40}(?:[a-f0-9]{24})?$/; const COMMIT_PATTERN = /^[a-f0-9]{40}(?:[a-f0-9]{24})?$/;
const cryptographicallyVerifiedManifests = new WeakSet<object>();
export interface DomainManifestEvidence { export interface DomainManifestEvidence {
digest: string; digest: string;
domainId: string; domainId: string;
repositoryId: string;
schema: typeof MANIFEST_SCHEMA; schema: typeof MANIFEST_SCHEMA;
signature: string;
signerId: string; signerId: string;
sourceCommit: string; sourceCommit: string;
verifierReceipt: { verifierReceipt: {
@ -17,6 +22,21 @@ export interface DomainManifestEvidence {
}; };
} }
export interface DomainManifestSignedPayload {
domainId: string;
repositoryId: string;
schema: typeof MANIFEST_SCHEMA;
signerId: string;
sourceCommit: string;
}
export interface TrustedManifestSigner {
algorithm: 'Ed25519';
publicKeyPem: string;
repositoryId: string;
signerId: string;
}
export interface DomainSessionCapability { export interface DomainSessionCapability {
capabilityId: string; capabilityId: string;
domainId: string; domainId: string;
@ -75,6 +95,16 @@ function invalidHandoff(): never {
throw new Error('domain_access_handoff_invalid'); throw new Error('domain_access_handoff_invalid');
} }
export function domainManifestSigningBytes(payload: DomainManifestSignedPayload): Buffer {
return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
domainId: payload.domainId,
repositoryId: payload.repositoryId,
schema: payload.schema,
signerId: payload.signerId,
sourceCommit: payload.sourceCommit,
}), 'utf8');
}
/** /**
* Validates the structure and binding of evidence returned by a trusted route. * Validates the structure and binding of evidence returned by a trusted route.
* Cryptographic signature verification is deliberately external: this boundary * Cryptographic signature verification is deliberately external: this boundary
@ -84,30 +114,45 @@ export function parseDomainAccessHandoff(
input: unknown, input: unknown,
expectedDomainId: string, expectedDomainId: string,
expectedNodeId: string, expectedNodeId: string,
trustedSigner: TrustedManifestSigner,
now = Date.now(), now = Date.now(),
): DomainAccessHandoff { ): DomainAccessHandoff {
if (!isRecord(input) || !hasExactKeys(input, ['connectionReceipt', 'manifest', 'sessionCapability'])) invalidHandoff(); if (!isRecord(input) || !hasExactKeys(input, ['connectionReceipt', 'manifest', 'sessionCapability'])) invalidHandoff();
const manifest = input.manifest; const manifest = input.manifest;
const capability = input.sessionCapability; const capability = input.sessionCapability;
const connection = input.connectionReceipt; const connection = input.connectionReceipt;
if (!isRecord(manifest) || !hasExactKeys(manifest, ['digest', 'domainId', 'schema', 'signerId', 'sourceCommit', 'verifierReceipt'])) invalidHandoff(); if (!isRecord(manifest) || !hasExactKeys(manifest, ['digest', 'domainId', 'repositoryId', 'schema', 'signature', 'signerId', 'sourceCommit'])) invalidHandoff();
if (!isRecord(capability) || !hasExactKeys(capability, ['capabilityId', 'domainId', 'expiresAt', 'nodeId', 'scopes'])) invalidHandoff(); if (!isRecord(capability) || !hasExactKeys(capability, ['capabilityId', 'domainId', 'expiresAt', 'nodeId', 'scopes'])) invalidHandoff();
if (!isRecord(connection) || !hasExactKeys(connection, ['connectionId', 'domainId', 'manifestDigest', 'nodeId', 'receiptId', 'state'])) invalidHandoff(); if (!isRecord(connection) || !hasExactKeys(connection, ['connectionId', 'domainId', 'manifestDigest', 'nodeId', 'receiptId', 'state'])) invalidHandoff();
const verifier = manifest.verifierReceipt;
if (!isRecord(verifier) || !hasExactKeys(verifier, ['manifestDigest', 'signerId', 'state', 'verifiedAt', 'verifierId'])) invalidHandoff();
const digest = manifest.digest; const digest = manifest.digest;
if (manifest.schema !== MANIFEST_SCHEMA if (manifest.schema !== MANIFEST_SCHEMA
|| typeof digest !== 'string' || !SHA256_PATTERN.test(digest) || typeof digest !== 'string' || !SHA256_PATTERN.test(digest)
|| manifest.domainId !== expectedDomainId || manifest.domainId !== expectedDomainId
|| manifest.repositoryId !== trustedSigner.repositoryId
|| manifest.signerId !== trustedSigner.signerId
|| trustedSigner.algorithm !== 'Ed25519'
|| !isIdentifier(trustedSigner.publicKeyPem)
|| !isIdentifier(manifest.signerId) || !isIdentifier(manifest.signerId)
|| typeof manifest.sourceCommit !== 'string' || !COMMIT_PATTERN.test(manifest.sourceCommit) || typeof manifest.sourceCommit !== 'string' || !COMMIT_PATTERN.test(manifest.sourceCommit)
|| verifier.state !== 'verified' || typeof manifest.signature !== 'string') invalidHandoff();
|| verifier.manifestDigest !== digest
|| verifier.signerId !== manifest.signerId const signedPayload = domainManifestSigningBytes({
|| !isIdentifier(verifier.verifierId) domainId: manifest.domainId,
|| typeof verifier.verifiedAt !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(verifier.verifiedAt) || verifier.verifiedAt > now) invalidHandoff(); repositoryId: manifest.repositoryId,
schema: manifest.schema,
signerId: manifest.signerId,
sourceCommit: manifest.sourceCommit,
});
if (createHash('sha256').update(signedPayload).digest('hex') !== digest) invalidHandoff();
let signature: Buffer;
try {
signature = Buffer.from(manifest.signature, 'base64');
if (signature.length !== 64 || signature.toString('base64') !== manifest.signature) invalidHandoff();
if (!verifySignature(null, signedPayload, trustedSigner.publicKeyPem, signature)) invalidHandoff();
} catch {
invalidHandoff();
}
if (!isIdentifier(capability.capabilityId) if (!isIdentifier(capability.capabilityId)
|| capability.domainId !== expectedDomainId || capability.domainId !== expectedDomainId
@ -124,7 +169,22 @@ export function parseDomainAccessHandoff(
|| connection.manifestDigest !== digest || connection.manifestDigest !== digest
|| connection.state !== 'online') invalidHandoff(); || connection.state !== 'online') invalidHandoff();
return input as unknown as DomainAccessHandoff; const handoff: DomainAccessHandoff = {
connectionReceipt: connection as unknown as DomainConnectionReceipt,
manifest: {
...(manifest as unknown as Omit<DomainManifestEvidence, 'verifierReceipt'>),
verifierReceipt: {
manifestDigest: digest,
signerId: manifest.signerId,
state: 'verified',
verifiedAt: now,
verifierId: 'HOLOLAKE-DESKTOP-ED25519',
},
},
sessionCapability: capability as unknown as DomainSessionCapability,
};
cryptographicallyVerifiedManifests.add(handoff.manifest);
return handoff;
} }
export function evaluateDomainAccess(evidence: DomainAccessEvidence, now = Date.now()): DomainAccessStatus { export function evaluateDomainAccess(evidence: DomainAccessEvidence, now = Date.now()): DomainAccessStatus {
@ -133,6 +193,7 @@ export function evaluateDomainAccess(evidence: DomainAccessEvidence, now = Date.
const manifest = evidence.manifest; const manifest = evidence.manifest;
const verifier = manifest?.verifierReceipt; const verifier = manifest?.verifierReceipt;
if (!manifest if (!manifest
|| !cryptographicallyVerifiedManifests.has(manifest)
|| manifest.schema !== MANIFEST_SCHEMA || manifest.schema !== MANIFEST_SCHEMA
|| manifest.domainId !== evidence.domainId || manifest.domainId !== evidence.domainId
|| !SHA256_PATTERN.test(manifest.digest) || !SHA256_PATTERN.test(manifest.digest)